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Olivia Partlow 
 
The Abduction of Japanese Latin Americans 
during World War II 
 
The United States has a reputation for being prejudiced towards 
new groups of immigrants. In the past we saw that when non-
English, Catholics, people of Asian descent and other groups 
began immigrating in large numbers. Today we see it with the 
large influx of Hispanic immigrants. From the 1920s through 
1940s this prejudice was directed at Japanese immigrants. There 
were laws in place that prevented Japanese immigrants from 
becoming citizens. The United States was not the only country to 
have laws against Japanese nationals. Several Latin American 
countries had similar laws. Peru had a very large population of 
Japanese immigrants and in turn had the most prejudice. The 
United States took this prejudice to the next level by interning 
people of Japanese ancestry residing on both United States and 
Latin American soil. The United States was able to intern Axis 
nationals from Latin American countries by using outdated laws 
and finding loopholes in current ones.  
When World War II broke out in Europe, the United States 
began planning for the internment of its Japanese population. The 
United States also enlisted several Latin American countries to 
arrest their people of Japanese as well as German and Italian 
descent and bring them to America to be interned. The United 
States planned the internment even though the Munson Report 
found that Japanese Americans were very patriotic and eager to 
show their support of America. Curtis B. Munson, a private 
citizen, was hired by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) 
to lead an investigation of the loyalty of Japanese Americans that 
resulted in the Munson Report.1 Munson recommended that 
internment was unnecessary, but that recommendation did not 
stop FDR from ordering it.2 The United States planned to 
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exchange the Japanese Latin Americans with Allied soldiers being 
held by Axis countries.3  
The Alien Enemies Act of 1798 gave FDR the power to 
intern “alien enemies.” The original Alien Enemies Act of 1798 
was created by a Federalist controlled congress as an attempt to 
quiet the Democratic-Republican opposition as well as protecting 
against possible French sympathizers during a time when a war 
with France seemed imminent.4 During World War II this law was 
abused by FDR. The Latin American countries cooperating in the 
kidnapping and deportation of Axis nationals arrested and 
confiscated the passports of these people. Once they were 
deported to the United States, the United States government used 
the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 as a way to legally hold the poor 
deportees because they could not provide their passports.5 
Although the Alien Enemies Act was outdated in 1941, that was 
not the first time it was abused in the twentieth century. 
During World War I the United States interned Germans 
and German Americans suspected in sabotage and did so using 
the Alien Enemies Act. The internment during World War I 
served as a precedent for the large-scale internment of Japanese 
nationals during World War II. The United States worked with 
several Latin American countries, especially Panama and Cuba, 
who collaborated by interning Germans living on their soils.6 
Latin American countries cooperated with the war and internment 
efforts because they were within the United States’ sphere of 
influence and many of their economies depended on continued 
support from the United States.  This carried through to World 
War II. The Charge in Bolivia wrote to Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull about their support of the United States and added, “Public 
opinion is mostly with us on our feeling, is superficial and based 
largely on the fact of Bolivian economic dependence on the United 
States.”7 The efforts made by the Latin American countries during 
World War I made the United States confident of continued 
cooperation during the time leading up to and during World War 
II.  
The Eighth International Conference of American States 
held in Lima, Peru in 1938 discussed the possible attack on a 
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neutral American country. This conference took place three years 
before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States’ entrance 
into World War II. The foreign ministers of the American States 
attended it and decided that the member states would consult 
each other if there were to be a threat to a neutral American 
country. Also concluded at Lima was that enemy aliens would be 
subject to the authority of the country in which they reside.8 
Although this was before war broke out in Europe, the decisions 
made in 1938 laid the foundation for the wartime policies of the 
United States and the Latin American countries toward their 
residents of Japanese ancestry. 
The following year, with the outbreak of war in Europe, all 
twenty-one foreign ministers of the American states met in 
Panama to discuss their previous conferences on American 
neutrality. The Inter-American Neutrality Committee was 
established at this time. The purpose of this committee was to 
provide legal advice to the states in the region so that they could 
stay out of world conflicts. The committee would later go on to set 
up the guidelines for internment.9 Also during the meeting in 
Panama, a security zone was set up around the American 
continent. The security zone was created so that warships could 
not come close to American soil. Axis ships that entered the 
security zone would be subject to search.10 
While Latin American states prepared to stay neutral 
during the war, the FBI, under President Roosevelt’s orders, began 
collecting intelligence on Axis nationals both in the United States 
and in Latin America beginning in 1939. The United States set up 
agencies throughout Latin America to monitor Japanese, 
Germans, and Italians that could become security threats.  During 
this time the FBI concentrated mostly on those Axis nationals that 
posed a threat. However, after the attack on Pearl Harbor the 
qualifications of a subversive quickly changed to include all those 
of Japanese ancestry and those of German or Italian ancestry who 
were suspected of fifth column activity. The United States was 
able to convince several Latin American countries and territories, 
namely Peru and Panama, to collect intelligence on their people as 
well.11  
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Foreign ministers met again at Havana, Cuba in 1940 to 
discuss the continued neutrality, but also the possibilities of action 
in the event of a non-American country’s hostility towards an 
American country. The declaration following the meeting stated, 
“That any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the 
integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the 
political independence of an American state shall be considered as 
an act of aggression against the states which sign this 
declaration.”12  It was this declaration that led most American 
states to declare war on Japan following the Pearl Harbor 
bombing.  
The Inter-American Neutrality committee, created at the 
1939 meeting of Foreign Ministers at Lima, met in 1940. At this 
meeting the Committee outlined internment as follows: 
 
The neutral State will intern in its territory, until 
the termination of the war, all individuals 
belonging to the land, sea or air forces of the 
belligerents, who individually or collectively enter 
its territory, as well as all officers and crews of 
warships, military airplanes and ships considered 
auxiliary vessels of war, in all cases in which the 
interning of the said ships and airplanes is 
appropriate.13 
 
It is this meeting that established how the internment process 
would take place. At this time it was understood that each 
country would intern its population on its own soil, with the 
United States footing the bill, but that was soon changed because 
it became too costly. The plan was later modified so that the 
United States would house all the internees.  
 A month and a half before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, Edwin C. Wilson negotiated 
Panamanian internment. According to this agreement, as soon as 
the United States acted, Panama would arrest and intern Japanese 
individuals on Panamanian soil. Panamanian guards would guard 
internees on Tobago Island, with the United States paying all 
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costs. The United States would also take any and all blame against 
negative claims, should they arise.14 The United States was very 
concerned with the Axis nationals living in Panama because of the 
security risk of the Panama Canal. Both the United States and the 
Panamanian governments believed that the Panama Canal could 
be a target.  
 On December 7, 1941, the Imperial Army of Japan attacked 
the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor. Immediately after 
the attack Latin American countries began writing to FDR and 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Almost every country in the 
Americas declared war on Japan following the United States, in 
accordance with the decisions made at the 1940 Havana 
Conference. Most Latin American states declared their support for 
the United States in the days following the attack.  
On December 8, the Chargé in Mexico, McGurk, wrote to 
Hull and assured him that, “according to our informant all 
Japanese subjects will be interned and the Japanese Minister will 
be handed his passports.”15 Mexico was different from the other 
Latin American countries because it chose to intern its Japanese 
subjects on its own soil instead of in the United States. Also on 
December 8, the United States ambassador to Panama, Wilson, 
sent a telegram to Hull notifying him that the internment of 
Japanese nationals around the Panama Canal as well as 
censorship of radio and other communications had already 
began.16  Panama was the first to cut diplomatic relations with 
Japan, declare war and begin to intern Axis nationals. As a United 
States territory that held the Panama Canal, Panama was vital to 
the United States’ internment policy.  
 Many countries arrested and detained Axis nationals but it 
was not until a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American 
Republics at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, that it was decided 
that the enemy aliens would be sent to the United States for 
internment. This decision was made because the cost would be too 
high for the United States to set up internment camps throughout 
Latin America rather than internment in a concentrated area in the 
United States.17 Plans for internment within the United States 
made it easier for the United States diplomats to convince the 
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Latin American states to participate in internment. Also decided 
at the Rio de Janeiro conference was that the United States would 
provide security to the hemisphere by moving troops into Latin 
America as well as providing financial support through Lend 
Lease programs.18 
 Ecuador required convincing to begin interning its alien 
enemies. In a telegram to Cordell Hull, Minister Long conveyed 
Ecuador’s concerns regarding internment plans: 
 
The President and Foreign Minister asked me to join them 
this afternoon and indicated they were exploring future 
possibilities. There are in Ecuador about 25 Japanese plus 
and active chargé d’Affaires. If Ecuador should declare 
war or even take some lesser step that might involve the 
Japanese in a concentration camp it is their feeling that 
Japan might endeavor to seize the Galápagos as a base 
which Ecuador is unable to prevent. Thus with the 
intention of helping us by interning the Japanese Ecuador 
might actually furnish Japan a pretext to seize the 
Galápagos. Is there anything that I can suggest in this 
connection?19 
 
On December 10th Hull responded to Long letting him know that 
the United States did not believe the Galápagos were in danger 
whatsoever while stressing the importance of internment.20 A day 
earlier, the Undersecretary of State, Welles, sent out a 
memorandum of his correspondence with the Ecuadorian 
government. Ecuador would be open to complying with all its 
inter-American agreements if an agreement of protection could be 
reached with the United States.21  Following this agreement 
Ecuador arrested its Japanese residents and sent them to the 
United States to be interned.  
 Peru followed a rather different course of action than 
Ecuador in dealing with its population of Japanese descent. There 
had been anti-Japanese sentiment in Peru ever since a large influx 
of Japanese immigrants began arriving during the earlier half of 
the nineteenth century.22 Peru also had anti-Japanese laws before 
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the internment process began and had cut off immigration from 
Japan in 1936.23 Peru saw the United States proposition as an easy 
way to rid itself of its Japanese population, the largest in all of 
Latin America. Eighty percent of all Latin American internees 
came from Peru. In 1942 undersecretary Welles estimated 1,053 
out of 1,747 total would come from Peru.24 Peru also received a 
$29 million Lend Lease for their collaboration during the war.25 
Officials in Peru had already decided to break diplomatic 
relations, declare war on Japan, and intern its Japanese population 
immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This was fueled 
mostly from anti-Japanese resentment due to their success in 
business and the cotton industry in Peru.26  
 The United States and the Latin American countries 
involved used deceitful practices to “legally” hold Axis nationals 
in the United States.  Once arrested and detained in their countries 
of residence, the enemy aliens had their passports seized. Then 
they were loaded onto ships to be brought to the United States. 
The first shipment of 325 enemy nationals came aboard the Etolin 
on April 5, 1942. 141 of the deportees were Peruvian Japanese, the 
others of German and Italian decent. Of the 141 Japanese 
detained, there was not one that had an arrest record and only 
seven were on the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals.27 
In the months and years following the first shipment, many 
women and children were either forcibly or voluntarily (in order 
to reunite with family members) interned. Once the deportees 
arrived in the United States, officials would ask for their passports 
and when no one was able to produce them, they were taken to 
camps to be interned.  
 Most internment camps for Japanese Latin Americans 
were located in Texas in places that previously housed Civilian 
Conservation Core (CCC) camps or other similar structures. The 
Kennedy camp in Kennedy, Texas housed the first internees from 
the Etolin. Like other camps, barbed wire fences and guard towers 
surrounded the Kennedy Camp. Internees were forced to do a 
daily line-up when a siren sounded at 9 A.M. Military personnel 
also heavily guarded them. During an inspection of the camp it 
was found out that the internees were refused ice water during 
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the scorching summer when temperatures rose to 100° F.  After 
this startling inspection a new director was placed in charge of the 
camp.28 
 Unlike the many Japanese Americans that were sent to 
internment camps, many of the Japanese Latin Americans were 
deported back to Japan in exchange for Allied nationals in Axis 
controlled countries. The first trade happened in the spring of 
1942 and mostly consisted of Japanese officials in exchange for 
United States officials.29 Most internees wished to return to Japan 
once they arrived in the United States. Some were forcibly 
deported back to Japan as part of an exchange and many 
voluntarily repatriated after the war was over.30 In a 1945 
Presidential Proclamation, Harry S. Truman ordered, all alien 
enemies be “[removed] to destinations outside the limits of the 
Western Hemisphere in territory of the enemy governments to 
which or to the principles of which they have adhered.”31 This 
forced many Japanese Latin Americans to return to Japan. Once 
the war and internment was over, Peru refused to let Japanese 
Peruvians return. These Peruvians either stayed in the United 
States or returned to Japan upon the termination of internment.  
 Decades after internment, Japanese Americans sought 
redress for the atrocities committed against them during World 
War II. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 apologized to Japanese 
Americans who had been interned and offered $20,000 to “eligible 
individuals.”32 Japanese Latin Americans were not considered 
eligible. Frustrated by the injustice, four Japanese Latin Americans 
brought a class action lawsuit against the United States. The 
United States settled and allotted $5,000 for each survivor and 
President Bill Clinton offered a public apology.33 The United 
States argued that the Japanese Latin Americans were not eligible 
for the full redress because they were technically illegal aliens.  
The United States Government abusing its power as a 
world leader as well as abusing its very own laws rendered the 
internment of Japanese Latin Americans possible. The United 
States blatantly disregarded reports, such as the one from Curtis 
Munson, that there was no need for internment. Most of the 
Japanese Latin Americans that were interned had never been in 
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trouble with the law and were selected because of the anti-
Japanese sentiment in their region. Besides acting on prejudices, 
the United States used outdated laws to justify the kidnapping of 
roughly 2500 people. Rather than acting as a response to the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, preparations for the internment of Japanese 
started well before December of 1941. Some laws and agreements 
used to justify it were concluded before the war even began in 
Europe. This was an outrageous abuse of power that 
unfortunately went unchecked for years and to this day has not 
been fully discussed. 
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